




Clarifying the conception of consciousness: Lonergan, Chalmers, and 
confounded epistemology
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University of West Georgia, Carrollton (USA)
Applying Bernard Lonergan’s (1957/1992, 1972) analysis of intentional consciousness and its concomitant epistemol-
ogy, this paper highlights epistemological confusion in contemporary consciousness studies as exemplifi ed mostly in 
David Chalmers’s (1996) position. In ideal types, a fi rst section outlines two epistemologies—sensate-modeled and 
intelligence-based—whose difference signifi cantly explains the different positions. In subsequent sections, this paper 
documents the sensate-modeled epistemology in Chalmers’s position and consciousness studies in general. Tellingly, 
this model of knowing is at odds with the formal-operational theorizing in twentieth-century science. This paper then 
links this epistemology with functionalism and its focus on descriptive effi cient causality in external behaviors and its 
oversight of explanatory formal causality; highlights the theoretical incoherence of the understanding of science in the 
functionalist approach; connects it with the construal of consciousness as primarily intentional (i.e., directed toward 
an object) to the neglect of consciousness as conscious (i.e., constituted by a non-objectifi ed self-presence); and relates 
this outcome to the reduction of human consciousness to animal-like perception and mechanistic interactions. A brief 
conclusion summarizes these multiple, subtle, and interconnected considerations and suggests how only an intellectual 
epistemology would be adequate to the intellectual nature of human consciousness and the world of meaning, not of 
mere bodies, in which humans exist.
Keywords: Chalmers, David J.; Lonergan, Bernard J. F.; philosophy of science; epistemology; consciousness, 
intentional and conscious. 
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INTRODUCTION1
David Chalmers (1996) has argued that con-
sciousness is a kind of reality in its own right—
so much so, in fact, that he is among the few 
contemporary theorists who would accept the 
label “dualist” (p.245). His point is that there 
are more than one kind of reality, the material, in 
our universe. Body and mind are different reali-
ties. The challenge, then, is to explicate what this 
conscious reality is.
Chalmers also insists that there can be a sci-
ence of consciousness, that consciousness is a 
natural phenomenon amenable in some way to 
natural scientifi c explanation (p.xiii). The chal-
lenge in this case becomes the traditional Car-
tesian “mind-body” problem: How can some-
thing spiritual result from something material 
and then affect each other? Beyond the scope of 
this paper, theories of “emergence” offer a vi-
able answer (Helminiak, 2015, pp.171-206). But 
in light of this question, a stream of specialized 
consciousness studies focuses on neuroscience 
and attempts to explain the mind as a byproduct 
(Griffi n, 1991, p.60) or a property (Searle, 1997, 
pp.13, 18, 194-195) or a feature (pp.xiv, 8, 17, 
18) or an emergence (Cahoone, 2008; Clayton 
and Davies, 2006; Henriques, 2004) of the brain. 
Little consensus exists in these matters, and little 
lucidity about what these terms mean.
In The Conscious Mind Chalmers (1996) of-
fers a sustained argument for his position. He 
feels forced to hold it. In honest self-revelation, 
he reports, “Temperamentally, I am strongly in-
clined toward materialist reductive explanation, 
and I have no strong spiritual or religious incli-
nations” (p.xiv). Yet, committed to taking both 
science and the undeniable experience of con-
sciousness seriously, he holds “consciousness to 
be a natural phenomenon, falling under the sway 
of natural laws” (p.xiii).
It is true that “consciousness is not directly 
observable in experimental contexts” (p.215), he 
writes. But “we each have access to a rich source 
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of data in our own case. We know about our own 
detailed and specifi c conscious experiences” 
(pp.215-216, emphases added). “The main in-
tuition at work is that there is something to be 
explained—some phenomenon associated with 
fi rst-person experience that presents a problem 
not presented by observation of cognition from 
the third-person point of view” (p.110, emphasis 
added).
Doggedly engaging considerable detail on 
these matters, Chalmers’s presentation also 
opens itself to many points of criticism. These 
initial quotations, for example, already exhibit 
an entangled use of the terms data, knowledge, 
experience, and intuition and evince an undif-
ferentiated conception of consciousness and 
knowing. Are data and experience the same, for 
example? Or does experience also include intu-
ition and knowledge? Is our access to data on 
conscious experiences tantamount to knowledge 
of them? Is knowledge more than experience 
or intuition, and if so, what? What role might 
intuition have in knowing? (Osbeck and Held, 
2014). Chalmers’s statements appear direct and 
standard enough until one begins to question 
them in light of more nuanced analyses. Then 
one can wonder what exactly they mean. Per-
haps in other arenas such seeming nitpicking 
would be mere perversity; but when the topic is 
consciousness, these minor issues become piv-
otal because consciousness is inherently linked 
with knowing, and knowing with ontology.
The “more nuanced analyses” I invoke come 
from Bernard Lonergan’s (1957/1992, 1972, 
1980/1990) lifelong study of human conscious-
ness and the cognitive process and epistemol-
ogy inherent in it. Without Lonergan’s theory at 
hand, one would surely be hard-pressed to sort 
through these subtle matters and posit defi ni-
tions, distinctions, and interrelationships. But 
given Lonergan’s theory, the need for clarifi ca-
tion becomes obvious. As with all science, im-
penetrable problems become lucid once a break-
through is made (McCarthy, 1990, 1997; Webb, 
1988). Accordingly, the goal of this paper is to 
illustrate the epistemological confusion in con-
temporary consciousness studies as exemplifi ed 
in David Chalmers’s position—citing him only 
as one highly documented case, not making of 
him the whipping boy for opinions that are per-
vasive and entrenched—and to suggest how the 
epistemology of Bernard Lonergan could bring 
some clarity to this fi eld (Helminiak, 2014, 
2015). The paper unfolds as outlined in the Ab-
stract.
TWO EPISTEMOLOGIES: PERCEPTUAL 
AND INTELLECTUAL
Ultimately at stake in the focus on epistemol-
ogy in consciousness studies is the question, “Is 
the mind or consciousness real?” Determination 
of the reality, an ontological conclusion, depends 
on the epistemology one employs. Knowing 
specifi es reality. So when theories of knowledge 
differ, the ability to coherently handle questions 
about the mind will differ, and claims for the re-
ality of the mind will also differ. Risking over-
simplifi cation but underlining my point by pro-
jecting “ideal types” (Weber, 1904/1997), as it 
were, I contrast two basic approaches to knowl-
edge: a sensate-modeled or perceptual, and an 
intelligence-based epistemology. My overall 
argument is that much of the confusion in con-
sciousness studies derives from the inadequacy 
of the epistemology being applied. The applica-
tion is usually implicit, and the epistemology 
is basically a sensate-modeled one, but usually 
also mixed with intellectual elements.
For a sensate-modeled epistemology, the real 
is what can be perceived, and, perforce, the real 
is usually limited to physical matter. In this case, 
knowing is usually modeled on vision; to know 
is to take a good look: “the spectator theory of 
knowing” (McCarthy, 1997, pp.8, 21), “the per-
ceptualist paradigm of knowing” (Webb, 1988, 
p.58), “the epistemology of the naked look” 
(Webb, p.74), “an epistemological confrontation-
ism” (Braman, 2008, p.61). One knows immedi-
ately by direct experience. A notorious example 
is Samuel Johnson’s kicking a stone to “refute” 
George Berkeley’s idealism. Similarly, for Ken 
Wilber (1996) knowing depends on “illumina-
tive seeing” so that “To know if it’s raining, go 
and look” (Wilber, 1996, pp.31- 32). Likewise, 
John Searle (1998) insists that “we perceive the 
real world ... In the normal perceptual situation, 
you just see the object directly. Your perception 
reaches right up to the object ... When you’re 
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looking at the object at point blank range in good 
light, you directly see the object” (lecture 7). 
Mentally, this sensate-modeled epistemology 
operates via picture thinking; imagined images 
guide the thought. Said otherwise, at stake is 
Jean Piaget’s (1936/1963) concrete-operational 
thinking. Typical of pre-pubescent children but 
dominating also the thinking of most adults, such 
thinking deals superbly well with matters that are 
“at hand,” that is, available for inspection and 
manipulation. However, although they might be 
part of a mix, such thinking does not explicitly 
acknowledge either the abstract, hypothetical 
thinking of Piaget’s formal operations—which 
can solve problems without having specifi c, con-
crete cases to play with—or the developmental, 
unitive thinking of postformal-operational think-
ing (e.g., Campbell and Bickhard, 1986; Com-
mons et al., 1984; Sinnott, 2010). 
On the basis of this sensate-modeled episte-
mology, the mind could not be real because it 
is invisible. By the same token, however, it is 
instructive to note, the quarks and leptons, the 
forces and fi elds, of current physics (Goldman, 
2007) could not be real either because none of 
them is perceptible. I know I present a caricature 
of this materialist or narrow empiricist position, 
but already an inconsistency has appeared, and I 
will also point out other clear examples of such 
sensate-modeled epistemology at work.
In contrast, for an intelligence-based episte-
mology, the real is what can be reasonably af-
fi rmed on the basis of relevant evidence. Not 
perceptible encounter, but validated insightful 
understanding determines what is real. In this 
matter I follow Bernard Lonergan (1957/1992, 
1972, 1980-1990). To understand the mind and 
its knowing, thoroughly empirical in his own 
way, committed to “generalized empirical meth-
od” (pp.95-96, 268), he turns to the phenomenon 
itself. He begins with an empirical question, 
“What am I doing when I am knowing?” (p.779, 
n. f). This phrasing, using the singular “I,” is ac-
curate because, in the nature of the matter, I can 
approach an answer only through my own expe-
rience. I cannot examine what transpires in other 
people’s minds. The instances of human know-
ing to which I have access are uniquely my own.
The general answer to that question is as fol-
lows. As a knower, in the pursuit of knowledge, I 
attempt to make sense of, to understand, the puz-
zling given that I encounter. (a) Awareness that 
prompts wonder or awe is the starting point of 
every intellectual endeavor. (b) When awareness 
turns to question and, after appropriate effort, in-
sight occurs, I generate a concept or an idea, and 
I formulate it in a statement, a hypothesis, a theo-
ry, a proposed explanation. Naturally concerned 
that my understanding actually be correct, (c) I 
check it against the given data; and via another 
kind of insight whereby I grasp—hopefully, in 
collaboration with others—that my understand-
ing does indeed account for all the data and that 
no further relevant questions remain, I am con-
strained by the very demands of my own mind to 
affi rm my explanation: It all fi ts. Eureka! I have 
correct understanding. I know something. I have 
achieved a sliver of knowledge. 
More technically and summarily formulated, 
human intellectual knowing entails three com-
ponents: (a) experience, (b) understanding, and 
(c) judgment. These three correlate with (a) data, 
(b) ideas, and (c) facts or knowledge. It is use-
ful to contrast this theory of knowing with the 
sensate-modeled theory. It usually stops with ex-
perience, and in the undifferentiated term expe-
rience it bottles up all the components of human 
conscious activity, and the supposition is that we 
know by encounter. Thus, Wilber (1996, pp.31-
32) could suggest that we know it is raining by 
going to the window and taking a look. To be 
sure, in many everyday, prosaic cases, knowl-
edge might appear to be such an instantaneous 
production. In those cases we take for granted 
and overlook the intellectual components of our 
knowing. To say that it’s raining, for example, 
requires more than the sensation of light refl ect-
ing off of falling water and impinging on the 
retina. One must also understand the consensual 
meaning of the term rain; make the connection 
between the percept and that defi ned meaning; 
conclude that the two match; eliminate, perhaps, 
the possibility that someone on the roof is spray-
ing water from a hose, and so on. What appears 
immediate (i.e., un-mediated) and instantaneous 
is actually a complicated process. Sensate-mod-
eled theories of knowing oversimplify the pro-
cess.
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It is hardly coincidental that Lonergan’s 
three-part formulation of knowing parallels the 
textbook presentation of scientifi c method: ob-
servation, hypothesis, and verifi cation. Modern 
science has hit upon the most credible ideal of 
knowing to date, and achievements of science 
provide our best examples of human knowing 
(Lonergan, 1980/1990, pp.6-13): We can claim 
knowledge when we can (c) reasonably ground 
our (b) ideas in relevant (a) data. 
Lonergan’s theory is a critical realism. It holds 
that what is known through this three-step pro-
cess is reality, that which exists, what is there to 
be known. Hence, epistemology leads into on-
tology. Technically said, the object of such dis-
tinctively human knowing is being (Lonergan, 
1957/1992, pp.372-398), and the project of hu-
man knowing thus understood is an ever-self-re-
fi ning, cumulative process that would terminate, 
in the ideal, only when we understood everything 
about everything. The reality known in this way 
is not merely—and sometimes not at all—mate-
rial; for in addition to data, our knowns include 
meaning, intelligibility, some understanding; 
and in addition to data and understanding, our 
knowns include actuality, a basis for correct af-
fi rmation. To be sure, most of what we know is 
material things, and their materiality is part of 
the intelligibility that pertains to them as instanc-
es of being, actualities of particular kinds that 
can be correctly affi rmed—as in the case of rain. 
But we also routinely encounter data that appear 
not to pertain to material things—emotions, in-
sights, ideas, ideals, and other intra-mental phe-
nomena, for example. The point is that one and 
the same epistemology, as formulated by Lo-
nergan, can apply to material and non-material 
realities alike and on the basis of the same crite-
ria can claim knowledge of them all. Succinctly 
stated, human knowledge is a composite of (a) 
data, (b) understanding, and (c) judgment, and 
“the real is the verifi ed; it is what is to be known 
by the knowing constituted by experience and 
inquiry, insight and hypothesis, refl ection and 
verifi cation” (Lonergan, 1957/1992, p.277).
On this basis, the mind can be deemed real. 
To posit mind is to offer a reasonable accounting 
for the data of consciousness (p.299; also pp.95, 
260, 358; 1972, pp.8-9, 201-202; see also James, 
1902/1961, pp.59-63), that is, the inner subjec-
tive “intuition” or the “experiences” that Chalm-
ers (1996, pp.110, 216) cannot deny. If the data 
of consciousness are deemed evidence as valid 
as are the data of the senses, to which physical 
science limits its concern, then valid data plus 
understanding plus judgment ground the affi r-
mation of the reality of the mind as surely as 
these three components of knowledge do in any 
other case. Startlingly, however, to posit mind is 
to conclude to the reality of some non-materi-
al being. Given twentieth-century science, this 
conclusion should hardly be novel. Quarks and 
leptons are deemed real, but in no way are they 
palpable. To posit them is to provide reason-
able accounts of the available, relevant data of 
the senses. Imperceptible in themselves, these 
physical entities are the conclusions of reason-
ing; they are meanings that must be affi rmed to 
coherently account for the relevant evidence. 
Not palpability, then, but meaning reasonably 
grounded in relevant evidence is the criterion of 
the real, explicitly so in Lonergan’s theory and 
implicitly in twentieth-century physics. 
The epistemology that Lonergan (1972) elab-
orates is to be a formulation of the very process 
at work in the human mind, “the native sponta-
neities and inevitabilities of our consciousness” 
(p.18) or “transcendental method” (pp.13-20), 
that inherent way of knowing that unavoid-
ably applies in every human case. Hence, this 
epistemology applies equally to physical being 
and non-physical being—because its intent is to 
characterize the very process of human know-
ing, not the myriad objects that could be known. 
On this basis of a reasonable account for rel-
evant data, both mind and matter are real—al-
though they are different kinds of reality, differ-
ent kinds of being, different expressions of what 
can accurately be affi rmed to exist. The chal-
lenge in understanding human consciousness is 
that the human being is a remarkable composite 
of many different kinds of being, but the mate-
rial body and its physical senses, because they 
are palpable and develop early, tend to dominate 
our theories (pp.488, 494, 497-498).
Of course, Lonergan’s epistemology has a po-
tential drawback. It is a foundational theory of 
knowledge. That is, it claims to elaborate a basis 
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on which all knowledge is justifi ed (cf. Braman, 
2008, pp.80–81, 86–91). But after the failures of 
Descartes, Kant, Hegel, logical positivism, lin-
guistic analysis, and phenomenology and in light 
of the resultant relativism of radical postmod-
ernism (cf. Rosenau, 1992, for discussion), late-
twentieth-century philosophers have generally 
deemed any foundationalism an impossibility. 
As philosopher Lawrence Cahoone (2010) re-
ports, for example, “The most famous American 
contributor to postmodernist philosophy, [Rich-
ard] Rorty argued that the search for the founda-
tions of knowledge is a bankrupt enterprise…; 
knowledge is simply whatever the verifi cation 
procedures of a society say it is” (p.85). How-
ever, most foundational theories propose a set of 
fundamental propositions or beliefs on the basis 
of which all other knowledge could be logically 
justifi ed (Poston, 2014). Gödel’s incomplete-
ness theorem categorically discredits any such 
logic-based endeavor (Penrose, 1994). In con-
trast, as intimated at the beginning of the prior 
paragraph, via “self-appropriation” (Lonergan, 
1980/1990, pp.2-21)—earlier and more descrip-
tively called “refl ection on performance” (1967, 
p. xiii)—Lonergan appeals to the intelligent 
nature of consciousness as the very engine that 
generates all propositions and beliefs. Loner-
gan’s (1972) foundation is deeper than the oth-
ers (pp. 260-270). Thus, Lonergan (1957/1992, 
pp.364-366) claims to have resolved the Kantian 
problem of knowing the thing in itself, yet that 
claim garners only a slowly growing hearing. 
Today’s commonsense philosophies and what-
works pragmatism might not even recognize the 
Kantian problem as a problem anymore. My at-
tention to Chalmers’s theory of consciousness 
attempts to support my assessment.
CHALMERS’S OPTION FOR PERCEPTU-
AL REALITY
Chalmers (1996) frequently evinces a sensate-
modeled working theory of knowledge and real-
ity. For him it is as if, for something to be real, 
it must be visible, perceptible in some way, or 
at least imaginable; reality has to have some in-
trinsic properties that one could almost get one’s 
hands on. The contrasting understanding is tell-
ing, so I must digress briefl y to make my point. 
Especially in the twentieth century, science 
has broken through to a more subtle, a purely 
intellectual, mode of explanation. In terms of 
what David Hilbert (1902/1971) called “implicit 
defi nition,” science explains things, not by say-
ing what they truly look or feel like to us, not 
by saying what use they are to us, but by relat-
ing them to one another to express what intel-
ligibility they entail, what can be understood 
about them. “What they are” does not mean how 
they appear but, rather, what explains their func-
tioning, what makes sense of our experience of 
them, what accounts for their being what they 
are, what natures they possess. For this reason, 
equations, statements of interrelationships such 
as a2 + b2 = c2 in the case of a Euclidean right 
triangle expressed algebraically—equations be-
come the coinage of perfected science. Engag-
ing the data, inquiry and insight make the break-
through and fi nally determine the necessary and 
suffi cient elements to account for things. Then, 
prescinding from any particular case and speak-
ing in complete abstract generality, scientists ex-
press that breakthrough with absolute precision 
by formulating the relationship among these ele-
ments. More stunningly than Pythagoras, for ex-
ample, but exemplifying the very same intellec-
tual “trick,” Einstein proposed E = mc2. In this 
usage, terms and relations mutually imply, con-
strain, specify, indeed, they defi ne one another. 
The relations dictate what terms must be in ques-
tion, and the terms in question require what the 
relations must be (Lonergan 1967/1992, pp.36-
37, 417, 515). If a, b, and c are the sides of a par-
ticular plane fi gure and a2 + b2 = c2, this fi gure 
is and could only be a right triangle. The sugges-
tion from Einstein is that the very natures of en-
ergy, mass, and light are precisely such that they 
lock together in the specifi c relationship, E = 
mc2. It expresses what is there to be understood; 
it expresses the realities that are there. Energy, 
for example, is precisely that which exhibits cer-
tain characteristics, namely, these specifi c rela-
tions with mass and light. Science attempts to 
provide an exact account of the intrinsic nature 
of things. Notice, however, that as understood, 
the characteristics are not perceptual; they are 
relational, purely intellectual, grasped by under-
standing and confi rmed by judgments. “No thing 
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itself, no thing as explained, can be imagined … 
Once one enters upon the way of explanation by 
relating things to one another, one has stepped 
out of the path that yields valid representative 
images” (Lonergan, 1957/1992, p.275). And the 
formulations of these explained characteristics, 
as in the case of the right triangle, look nothing 
like what is being explained.
Now, Chalmers (1996) is uncomfortable with 
this scientifi c state of affairs—as is fully under-
standable: Refi ned explanation often counters 
common sense and challenges assumptions in 
the everyday world. The sun is not moving, but 
the earth. This metal and this wood are the same 
temperature although the metal feels cooler than 
the wood. It is strange to think that the solid mate-
rials in our world would be mostly empty space, 
as physicists suggest. In computerese, Chalmers 
depicts the scientifi c account as a theory of “It 
from Bit”: Reality is “a world of pure informa-
tion” (p.303), a “pure causal fl ux.” He accurately 
notes that “physical theory only characterizes its 
basic entities relationally … The picture of the 
physical world that this yields is that of a gi-
ant causal fl ux” (p.153). His discomfort is that 
he wants something more “substantive.” In this 
case I see emerging a sensate-modeled episte-
mology, geared to perceptions, demanding pal-
pable satisfaction.
Chalmers thinks contemporary physics leads 
to “a strangely insubstantial view” (p.153), “too 
lacking in substance to be a world” (p.304). He 
looks for “the very ‘massiveness’ of mass, for 
example” (p.153). He wants, as if, something to 
get his hands on. A purely intellectual account-
ing of our world does not seem to treat reality. 
Indeed, who could know by just looking that a2 + 
b2 = c2 really depicts a right triangle? But at this 
point, it seems that for Chalmers the real must be 
palpable in some way; it seems that reality must 
be what is sensitively encountered. What cannot 
be somehow perceived could hardly be human 
reality. Besides, missing the point of implicit 
defi nition, Chalmers opines that this causal fl ux 
“tells us nothing about what all this causation 
relates. Reference to the proton is fi xed as the 
thing that causes interactions of a certain kind, 
that combines in certain ways with other enti-
ties, and so on; but what is the thing that is doing 
the causing and combining?” (p.153), he asks. 
Supposedly, “this view subtracted the world of 
all intrinsic qualities, leaving a world of causal 
relations, with nothing, it seems, to do the caus-
ing …  One might fi nd this picture of the world 
without intrinsic nature not to be a picture of the 
world at all.” (p.304) 
When scientists propose the intrinsic qualities 
of things, they formulate the inherent intelligi-
bilities of the things—what can be understood 
about them and validly affi rmed. Accordingly, 
with Lonergan reality is the object of correct 
judgment, and with Hilbert reality is precisely 
articulated through implicit defi nition. The re-
lational product that results is hardly the bodies 
that eyes could see and hands could grasp. Hu-
man knowing opens onto a universe that with 
Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas transcends the per-
ceptual, that with Einstein de-absolutizes space 
and time. Stunningly, being is of a whole other 
order in comparison to what we tend to think in 
our daily commonsensical comings and goings. 
(As I re-read this sentence, I am struck by how 
glibly it rolls by, but its point is monumental.) 
But when Chalmers asks for intrinsic qualities, 
he means perceptible characteristics. He imag-
ines realities to be amenable to human sense ex-
perience. His innocent but repeated use of the 
metaphor “picture” is itself revealing. It’s as if it 
requires seeing something.
Chalmers (1996) wants the entities of phys-
ics to have some internal qualities, some intrin-
sic properties; but, he objects, physicists “tell 
us nothing directly about what those properties 
might be” (p.153). The elaborate specifi cations 
that physics gives about a proton, for example, 
are not enough. The mass of an electron relative 
to other particles, accurate to the twelfth decimal 
point, is not enough. Seeming at this point to rely 
on a sensate-modeled epistemology, searching 
underneath the scientifi c explanations for some-
thing perceptible or, at least, imaginable, Chalm-
ers opines, “Intuitively, it is more reasonable to 
suppose that the basic entities that all this cau-
sation relates have some internal nature of their 
own, some intrinsic properties, so that the world 
has some substance to it” (p.153). Seemingly, re-
ality should be palpable.
Chalmers’s concern is not without valid ba-
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sis. Not only does science often discredit com-
monsensical understanding—as regards the 
movement of the earth rather than the sun or 
the emptiness of matter rather than its solidity, 
for example. But science also deals “merely” in 
explanation and intelligibility, and they entail 
generalization. Scientifi c explanation pertains to 
whole swaths of individual entities, “all things 
being equal” and only insofar as they are equal. 
On the principle that similars are similarly un-
derstood (Lonergan, 1957/1992, pp.61-62, 313), 
science proposes one abstracted understanding 
that applies to all individuals of a particular kind. 
In this situation, it is as if the individuals get lost 
because the specifi city of this one, rather than 
that one, is irrelevant for explanation. So Chalm-
ers is correct to protest that the world is com-
posed of particulars and is not simply a “pure 
causal fl ux” because there are particular entities 
existing and interacting within that system of 
theoretical explanation. The question is, “How 
does one account for the individualities?”
Chalmers (1996) would account for them by 
attributing to all entities the sensate qualities 
that allow us to experience material things in 
the everyday world: They have colors, shapes, 
textures, densities, and all the qualities that our 
sense organs perceive (pp.4, 220). He would at-
tribute such qualities even to those entities that 
are fully imperceptible—surely mistakenly, be-
cause of their natures and because of the well un-
derstood mechanisms and limitations of human 
sensation and perception. Subatomic particles 
simply cannot be perceived per se—although 
with cleverness they can be understood and in 
popularized picture-thinking they can be imag-
ined. Individualities cannot depend on perceptu-
al characteristics, for these, too, can fall into cat-
egories and have explanations that apply across 
individuals. Perceptual characteristics, even if 
oxymoronically posited in non-perceptual enti-
ties, fall under scientifi c explanation and, thus, 
become once again just aspects of generalized 
understanding. What does not fall under expla-
nation are the mere matters of fact—that this is 
this one, and that is that one; that this one is here, 
and that one is there; that this one is now, and that 
one was then. We may have before us two maple 
trees, but their locations are irrelevant for under-
standing what a maple is. In this regard, Chalm-
ers (1996) invokes the standard philosophical 
notion of “indexicality” (pp.84–85). More ex-
planatorily, Lonergan (1957/1992) refers to the 
intellectually irrelevant characteristics of mate-
rial beings as “the empirical residue” (pp.50-
55). It is part of empirical facticity—a matter of 
judgment, not of understanding; facticity is not 
amenable to explanation; facticity deals in sheer 
givens. “Inasmuch as we are understanding, we 
are grasping the universal apart from its instanc-
es,… the invariant apart from particular places 
and times” (p.540). Recognition of the nature of 
explanation grounds the generalizations of sci-
ence in their instantiations in particular instances 
and then can apply the generalizations to under-
stand the particular instances. The particularity 
of individuals does not get lost in the whole mul-
tifaceted enterprise of explanation.
Recognition of the empirical residue would 
seem to respond to the need for what, I suspect, 
Chalmers imaginatively wants to call “intrin-
sic properties,” “substance,” and the “internal 
nature” pertaining to particular entities. But 
Chalmers’s solution evinces a way of knowing 
that is signifi cantly entangled with sensate-mod-
eled epistemology. It would deem real what can 
be experienced perceptually, so to give individ-
ual identity even to subatomic particles, to make 
them real, Chalmers (1996) attributes to them 
“protophenomenal” or “microphenomenal prop-
erties” (p.305). In the process he must believe 
that science “tells us nothing about what all [its] 
causation relates” (p.153) as if the implicitly 
defi ned explanations of things do not say what 
they really are, as if a2 + b2 = c2 does not really 
defi ne, characterize, and explicate a Euclidean 
right triangle. A sensate-modeled epistemology 
controls Chalmers’s thinking at this point.
SALVAGING CONSCIOUSNESS BY POS-
ITING PERCEPTS IN ALL THINGS
By intrinsic or substantial Chalmers means 
perceptually discerned, not intellectually con-
cluded. He ventures to suggest what those intrin-
sic properties might be: phenomenal properties 
(p.154), that is, those properties that characterize 
our conscious experiences of things—for exam-
ple, the experience of red and blue or heavy and 
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light. In other words, said succinctly, the primor-
dial properties of matter are supposedly percepts. 
Or, if this is too much, although picture-thinking 
must have its due, “an alternative is that the rel-
evant properties are protophenomenal proper-
ties” (p.154). These could in some way perhaps 
aggregate to explain how we experience, say, 
redness in the everyday world: “Microphenom-
enal properties add up to macrophenomenology” 
(p.307). And yes, then, as somehow entailing 
percepts, supposedly all entities must somehow 
also have consciousness. After all, supposedly, if 
the essence of consciousness is the occurrence of 
perceptual properties; where there are perceptu-
al properties, there must also be consciousness. 
(This conclusion is unwarranted. The fact that I 
can consciously perceive a leaf as green in no 
way necessitates that the leaf or its color itself 
also enjoys perception of any kind or that their 
constitutive atomic elements are colored in any 
way.) The suggestion is that “every time a fea-
ture such as mass and charge is realized, there is 
an intrinsic property behind it: a phenomenal or 
protophenomenal property, or a microphenom-
enal property for short” (p.305).
By positing these microphenomenal proper-
ties in the entities of physics, Chalmers now has 
bodies to relate in that causal fl ux, dots of mat-
ter that could be connected by causal lines, as it 
were—and all could be pictured. And, by posit-
ing these microphenomenal properties in the en-
tities of physics, he has also supposedly supplied 
a basis for our conscious, perceptual experiences 
in the macrophenomenal world, namely, bits of 
perceptions that accumulate as we move up from 
subatomic particles to objects in our everyday 
world. Supposedly, we have perceptions because 
even quarks and leptons have percepts attached 
to them, and these microphenomenal qualities 
build up until we are able to experience them 
with our eyes, ears, fi ngers, noses, and tongues 
and, thus, know what is real.
Thus, Chalmers has provided a theory of con-
sciousness under the name of ubiquitous per-
cepts. Disappointing for me to realize, this pan-
psychism is the substance of Chalmers’s insis-
tence that consciousness is natural and real. He 
saves consciousness by positing it as a natural 
principle of the universe that parallels material-
ity. But to do so, he has turned theoretical sci-
ence into a matter of sensations and perceptions. 
He has reduced consciousness to perception; and 
fi nding percepts, and then perception, every-
where, he also fi nds consciousness everywhere.
More accurately, he has mixed science and 
common sense, theory and perceptions. He has 
a notion of science that struggles against itself—
beholden simultaneously to intelligence and to 
perception, determined to be truly scientifi c but 
committed fi rst and foremost to behaviors in the 
everyday world, called a theory but beholden to 
concrete-operational thinking. But, at least, this 
notion leaves the world “substantial,” not mostly 
empty space; and this theory “saves” conscious-
ness by positing it as a fundamental principle 
in the form of universal percepts. Even entities 
that are beyond the possibility of sense experi-
ence are imagined to have perceptual qualities, 
so the criterion of reality must be perceptibility. 
Perforce, all reality must somehow be material. 
Although dualistically Chalmers affi rms con-
sciousness as a kind of reality in itself, his work-
ing epistemological presuppositions appear to 
disqualify the reality of anything non-perceptual 
and, therefore, non-material.
Chalmers is using a sensate-modeled epis-
temology to determine the reality even of the 
invisible, imperceptible entities discovered by 
contemporary physics. He would insert percep-
tual contents back into the intellectual account 
of science. Routinely appealing to science and 
struggling to propose a “scientifi c” theory of 
consciousness, he would, nonetheless, make per-
ception, not confi rmed understanding, the crite-
rion of reality. His suggestion is that quarks and 
leptons and all those others must have something 
perceptible about them if they are real.
FUNCTIONALIST EFFICIENT CAUSAL-
ITY VERSUS INTELLIGENTLY DIS-
CERNED FORMAL CAUSALITY
Such a perception-beholden view is closely 
linked to a particular understanding of causality, 
namely, that of the perceptible push-pull interac-
tion of effi cient causality in the everyday world. 
Physicists are content—if they speculate about 
it at all—to understand causality as the relation 
of mutual interdependence among the empiri-
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cally verifi ed elements named in their equations. 
Thus, for example, a, b, and c in a particular 
relationship determine a plane right triangle. 
These elements specify one another; they inter-
actively require what one another must be. In 
this sense, they cause one another. But the cau-
sality in question is hardly palpable; it is not the 
effect of one body reacting against another body. 
Rather, the elements a, b, and c are constrained 
by their relationship, namely, the hard-won rela-
tionship that intelligence discovered in this case. 
This causality is a matter of pure intelligibility, 
so it is Aristotle’s formal causality—that which 
makes things what they are. In contrast, Chalm-
ers wants causality to be more perceptible and to 
entail palpable bodies that can interact. Causal-
ity is to be the tug and pull among some kind 
of imaginable substantive properties, miniature 
lumps of stuff, micro-perceptibles, primordial 
bits of conscious contents, lying behind or with-
in the physicists’ equations. The problem is con-
founded epistemology: Two notions of knowing 
vie for dominance.
Chalmers (1996) provides a striking example 
of the pervasive trend in contemporary philoso-
phy to reverse the priority of intelligence over 
perception, to revert from theoretical commit-
ments to commonsensical speculation. This re-
versal is related to the rejection of all foundation-
alism. Contemporary philosophy has despaired 
of ever being able to give a coherent account of 
human knowing, to provide a cognitive founda-
tion on which all knowledge would rest. Current 
thinking settles for attention to “public action” in 
the everyday world (American Pragmatism) or 
else focuses on clarifying natural-language us-
age (Linguistic Analysis) or else attends to the 
specifi c contents of commonplace, intra-subjec-
tive experiences (Phenomenology) (Cahoone, 
2010, p.47). Under the name of functionalism 
(on “psycho-functionalism” see Spalding, Sted-
man, Hancock and Gagné, 2014), Chalmers em-
ploys an uneven mix of all three. Accordingly, 
functionalism focuses on what things do, how 
they interact, and what behaviors result, and the 
arena of this activity is the everyday world, avail-
able to human perception (plus some overlooked 
measure of human intelligence). Thus, for exam-
ple, the external behaviors of a consciousness-
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less zombie are all that matter, baffl ingly pre-
sumed to be indistinguishable in every way from 
the behaviors of a conscious human (Chalmers, 
1996, pp.94-95, 120-121, 156, 158-160; Den-
nett, 1991, pp.76, 311, 406; see Blackmore, 
2012). As supposed empirical science, on the ba-
sis of what evidence does this presumption rest? 
Who has studied these zombies and documented 
their characteristics so that appeal to them could 
ground an argument about consciousness and 
the lack thereof? Supposedly, science is to at-
tend only to external behaviors, and an account 
of their functioning would constitute the genuine 
contribution of science. Said otherwise, explana-
tion is a matter of causal roles, a matter of how 
these things make those things happen, yet, tell-
ingly, the causality in question appears to be the 
tug and pull of imagined effi cient causality.
Chalmers (1996) offers striking examples. 
Heat “is the kind of thing that expands metals, 
is caused by fi re, and leads to a particular sort of 
sensation” (pp.44-45; I ignore the mix of com-
monsense and science in this list). That is, what 
is most important about heat, what is primary, 
is how we experience it “in the actual world” 
(p.45), the world of everyday interactions. In 
this work-a-day world of commonplace experi-
ences, what heat means is what it does or could 
be used for. Of course, modern science has gone 
to the heart of the matter and actually explained 
heat in itself and, on this basis, explains why 
heat does what it does: The “motion of mole-
cules is what plays the relevant causal role in the 
actual world” (p.45). That is, we now know that 
the motion of molecules is what results from fi re, 
makes metals expand, and makes skin hurt. But 
for Chalmers this scientifi c explanation is not 
the primary meaning of heat, not what defi nes 
heat. The scientifi c explanation is secondary. 
What defi nes heat is what it means to us, what 
heat does to us and around us, not what heat is in 
itself. “Explaining heat involves explaining the 
fulfi llment of the causal role … Once we dis-
cover how that causal role is played, we have an 
explanation of the phenomenon. As a bonus, we 
know what heat is” (p.45).
Although he plays both sides of the fi eld by 
acknowledging that “causal role,” for Chalmers 
explanation fundamentally means to understand 
DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2015; 8(2): 59-74
Helminiak, 2015
our encounters with heat in the everyday world, 
the spatio-temporal, material world of physical 
and perceptual push-pull interactions—“the ac-
tual world,” that is, the one we perceive around 
us: Heat is what burns us; the real is what we 
bump into. The explanatory contribution of sci-
ence is just “a bonus.”
Similar considerations apply to water. For 
Chalmers, primarily, fi rst and foremost, water 
names “the dominant clear drinkable liquid in 
the oceans and lakes”; it is “the watery stuff in a 
world” (Chalmers, 1996, p.57). Only secondari-
ly and as another extra, water is H2O. It might as 
well be XYZ. This fact would not matter as long 
as it functions as “the dominant clear, drinkable 
liquid in the environment” (Chalmers, 1996, 
p.57). Realities are defi ned by the everyday, hu-
man experience and use of them—what they are 
to us, not what they are in themselves. Personal 
experience displaces any need for implicit defi -
nition.
In passing, note how Chalmers’s terminologi-
cal usage contrasts with Lonergan’s and depreci-
ates the meaning of explanation. For Lonergan 
(1957/192) description names our account of 
how things relate to us and our senses. On the 
other hand, explanation, the task of science, 
understands how things relate to one another 
(pp.316-317, 368-369); and as a purely intellec-
tual enterprise, perfected science expresses those 
relationships via implicit defi nition, as discussed 
above. It is critical to emphasize that, along with 
agnostic postmodern philosophy that despairs of 
any foundational account of knowledge, func-
tionalism opts for personal engagement in the 
work-a-day world, characterized by organic vi-
tality and animal perception, as the prime con-
cern of human knowing. Human distinctiveness 
gets lost.
FUNCTIONALISM: SCIENCE AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF
The point to be made here is simple enough. 
The notion of science in much of contemporary 
consciousness studies and psychology overall 
(Spalding et al., 2014) is incoherent. Conscious-
ness studies is committed to being as scientifi c 
as modern science stunningly is, yet in practice 
consciousness studies rejects the contemporary 
intellectualist understanding of science. As best 
I understand them (Helminiak, 2015), current 
studies of consciousness in philosophy, psychol-
ogy, and computer science aim toward some sci-
entifi c account; yet the presuppositions of this 
enterprise run counter to contemporary science 
in its most successful forms—physics and chem-
istry. 
• Whereas the “hard sciences” opt for a theo-
retical explanation of things, functionalism pri-
oritizes a commonsensical, perceptualist under-
standing. 
• Whereas the hard sciences are well aware that 
what they can reasonably affi rm is hardly palpa-
ble, functionalism sets up palpable interactions 
“in the actual world” as a controlling criterion. 
• Whereas the hard sciences see H2O and mo-
lecular motion as the primary explanations of 
water and heat, functionalism focuses primarily 
on “watery stuff” that we drink and the “no-no” 
that causes burns.
• Whereas science proposes fully theoretical ex-
planations from which the explanations of every-
day events follow, functionalism prizes every-
day interactions and relegates the achievements 
of science to the secondary status of a bonus.
• Whereas the hard sciences understand mass 
within an explanatory web of relationships 
with other fundamental realities, functionalism 
would suppose as “intuitively … more reason-
able…that the basic entities that all this causa-
tion relates have some internal nature of their 
own, some intrinsic properties … [such as] the 
very ‘massiveness’ of mass” (Chalmers, 1996, 
p.153), and mass becomes humanly experienced 
heaviness—although it is still matters in weight-
less space!
• Whereas science relies on intelligence reason-
ably grounded in evidence and with Einstein 
even transcends the particularities of space and 
time, functionalism appeals to perception and 
attends to personal experiences of push-pull en-
counters in the spatial, temporal world. 
In brief, science opts for an intellectual epis-
temology, but a sensate-modeled epistemology 
controls functionalism.
CONSCIOUSNESS LIMITED TO INTEN-
TIONALITY AND CHARACTERIZED BY 
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES (QUALIA)
Chalmers (1996) stands as a rare philosophi-
cal voice defi ning consciousness as something 
distinct in itself and willing even to wear the la-
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bel “dualist.” Nonetheless, Chalmers still over-
looks the essence of the uniqueness he would 
defend. Overwhelmingly, he characterizes con-
sciousness as intentional. In this usage, the term 
intentional has nothing to do with current psy-
chotherapeutic jargon that emphasizes delibera-
tion, choice, or planning; rather, the term ex-
presses the root Latinate meaning of directional-
ity (in + tendere = to stretch toward). Applied 
to consciousness, it implies a subject-object 
duality. Intentionality means that the subject is 
attending to, directed toward, refl ecting on, in-
tending some object. Almost ubiquitously, con-
sciousness studies identify human conscious-
ness with intentionality (see Blackmore, 2012). 
The slogan holds that consciousness is always 
consciousness of something. Thomas Natsoulas 
(1978) emphatically makes this point: “It is ar-
guably our most basic concept of consciousness. 
One’s being conscious, whatever more it might 
mean, must include one’s being aware of some-
thing” (p.910).
To be precise, in Chalmers’s (1996) case the 
matter is not black and white—or, at least, it is 
not easily determinable. Chalmers does speak 
repeatedly of “conscious experience” in the sin-
gular. Referring to the biological processes that 
neuroscience can specify, he writes, “When we 
perceive, think, and act, there is a whir of cau-
sation and information processing, but this pro-
cessing does not usually go on in the dark. There 
is also an internal aspect; there is something it 
feels like to be a cognitive agent. This internal 
aspect is conscious experience.” (p.4)
By “conscious experience” Chalmers might be 
alluding to “non-refl ecting consciousness” (Hel-
miniak, 1996, p.45; see also 1984, 2014, 2015), 
that is, to consciousness as “conscious,” not 
merely to consciousness as “intentional” (Loner-
gan, 1972, pp.6-9; also 1957/1992, pp.299-300, 
344-346). In question might be the distinctively 
human experience of subjectivity itself, the self-
consciousness of the subject qua subject, some-
times called “consciousness of consciousness” 
or “awareness of awareness.” It would be a con-
stant that pertains across the diverse experiences 
of different contents of consciousness. James 
(1890/1950) referred to it, in contrast to the ex-
perience of objects, as “an obscurer feeling of 
something more; ... of nothing objective at all 
but rather of subjectivity as such” (p.305). Not-
ing a commonplace in Eastern thought, Tarthang 
Tulku (1979) relates that: “according to the Bud-
dhist way of looking, …mind is not just ‘being 
aware of” an object ... There is a more pervasive 
substratum of consciousness, termed kun-gzhi in 
Tibetan, which is a kind of intrinsic awareness 
which is not involved in any subject-object dual-
ity” (pp.41-42). If by “conscious experience” in 
the present case Chalmers might be referring to 
kun-gzhi, the allusion is quickly obscured.
Chalmers’s (1996) singular conscious experi-
ence quickly drifts into a plural, a multiplicity 
of conscious experiences, and they and their re-
spective particularities become the actual focus 
of his concern about consciousness (pp.4, 6). 
This drift appears deliberate. Chalmers asserts, 
“The subject matter [consciousness or conscious 
experience] is perhaps best characterized as ‘the 
subjective quality of experience.’” This phrase 
is a perfect parallel to Nagel’s (1974) putative 
“subjective character of experience” in bats and 
other creatures (p.444). When Chalmers (1996) 
elaborates this experience, he shows that he 
does, indeed, take it to be multiple:  “Conscious 
experiences [plural] range from vivid color sen-
sations to...aromas; from…pains to…thoughts 
on the tip of the tongue; from sounds and smells 
to ... musical experience ... All these have a dis-
tinct experienced quality” (p.4). Clearly, now, 
the experienced quality in question, that “subjec-
tive quality of experience,” is that quality proper 
respectively to each of the specifi c contents of 
awareness.
Moreover, Chalmers makes this focus central 
to his theory of consciousness. In addition to the 
very existence of consciousness as his fi rst theo-
retical concern, Chalmers’s second object of the-
oretical concern is “the specifi c character of con-
scious experiences” (Chalmers, 1996, p.5)—in 
the plural. That character is red, rather than blue 
(p.5); book, rather than dagger (p.220). Thus, 
this singular “specifi c character” of the plural 
“conscious experiences” unfolds into a catalog 
of many different experiences with specifi c char-
acteristics: touch, smell, taste, temperature, pain, 
bodily sensations, mental imagery, thoughts, and 
emotions (pp.7-10).
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Clearly, Chalmers’s attention is not on the ex-
perience of the very presence of these contents 
“to” the experiencing subject, not on the consis-
tent experience “of” experience itself. The quo-
tation marks around the prepositions are to in-
dicate that, in this peculiar case, the preposition 
does not take an object but references a psycho-
logical subject. The presence of a subject “to” 
him- or herself is not, in the fi rst instance, an 
objectifying presence—e.g., thinking about one-
self—but is only a raw experience amenable to 
subsequent objectifi cation (see Helminiak, 1996, 
pp.46-47, 2014, 2015). But Chalmers’s attention 
is on the intentional dimension of consciousness, 
namely, the particular and diverse characteristics 
of whatever object is being experienced. Per-
vasively in the fi eld (see Blackmore, 2012), an 
alternative term for the experience in question 
is “qualia,” a Latin neuter plural adjective used 
substantively to mean “such-ness-es.” Suppos-
edly, qualia actually specify consciousness: “We 
can say that a mental state is conscious if it has 
a qualitative feel—an associated quality of ex-
perience. These qualitative feels are also known 
as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short” 
(Chalmers, 1996, p.4).
Rightly renowned for faulting theorists for 
avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, 
Chalmers writes, “The problem of explaining 
these phenomenal qualities is just the problem 
of explaining consciousness. This is the really 
hard part of the mind-body problem” (Chalmers, 
1996, p.4). Chalmers is correct to this extent: 
Accounting for the varied experienced qualities 
of any particular objects of experience is a hard 
problem of consciousness—because, I would 
insist, the very experience of qualia is, indeed, 
something different, if inseparable, from the 
underlying brain processes (Helminiak, 2015, 
pp.281-302). However, Chalmers overlooks 
the even harder problem of accounting for the 
subjective experience per se of any experience 
whatsoever, regardless of its particular qualia. 
He does acknowledge this problem but ever 
only in passing. Chalmers (1996) would call this 
dimension of conscious experience “acquain-
tance” (p.197). He elaborates, “One sometimes 
feels that there is something to conscious experi-
ence that transcends all these specifi c elements: 
a kind of background hum, for instance, that is 
fundamental to consciousness … the phenom-
enology of the self … very hard to pin down” 
(p.10; see also passing allusions pp.4, 27, 204, 
246, 270).
Indeed! This “background hum” is the very 
matter that constitutes the distinctiveness of hu-
man self-consciousness. The distinctiveness is 
not the everyday experience of one’s becoming 
to oneself an object of awareness or concern; 
it is not about adverting to oneself or thinking 
about oneself; it is not about refl ecting on one-
self; it is not about becoming the object, “me,” of 
one’s own awareness. It is about being a subject, 
“I,” present non-refl ectingly “to” oneself within 
the very act of being present refl ectingly to any 
object. It is the matter of subjectivity. Nonethe-
less, the perceptualist interpretation is the under-
standing that theorists most commonly give to 
consciousness: awareness of an object.
Again I discern a sensate-modeled theory of 
knowing operative in that mainline interpreta-
tion. As if consciousness were another version 
of sensation wherein a physical stimulus en-
counters a physical receptor, consciousness is 
also imagined to be the confrontation of the sub-
ject and some object, body against body. So the 
novelty of human consciousness that emerged in 
natural history, over and above the responsive-
ness of animal sensation and perception—hu-
man uniqueness goes unnoticed.
Chalmers (1996) identifi es consciousness 
with the diverse experiences of qualia. He char-
acterizes consciousness, not in itself, but by 
the characteristics of the multiple contents that 
awareness might have. His understanding of 
consciousness is merely intentional and, what is 
more, almost uniquely perceptual. Why so? 
A controlling concern in consciousness stud-
ies (see Blackmore, 2012) is the mind-body 
problem, the challenge of linking consciousness 
with brain processes. We already know a good 
bit about some of them, visual perception, for 
example, although knowledge even of this best 
understood of mental phenomena quickly breaks 
down as neuroscience moves up the levels of vi-
sual processing in the brain. But wonder, awe, 
question, insight, judgment, decision—all the 
distinctively human mental acts—are still pure 
mystery to neuroscience, still virtually the pro-
verbial ghost in the machine. “Despite defi ni-
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tional complexities, consciousness is an active 
area of study with many competing theoretical 
models but not, at yet, much hard physiological 
data” (Breedlove and Watson, 2013, p. 584; but 
see Kounios and Beeman, 2009, 2014). Accord-
ingly, proposing experiential parallels to neu-
roscientifi c fi ndings and even literally identify-
ing consciousness with them (e.g., Churchland, 
1996; Dennett, 1991), consciousness studies 
focuses on “conscious experience” in terms of 
its contents. Of course, percepts offer a ready 
and—well, relatively—easy topic. So emphasis 
on qualia is pervasive in consciousness stud-
ies. But this emphasis on subjective or qualita-
tive “feels” is a distraction. It diverts attention 
from consciousness itself to the many objects 
of awareness and their particular experienced 
qualities.
To link perceptions and qualia is to overlook 
the distinctiveness of human consciousness and 
to posit qualia and, perforce, consciousness 
wherever perception occurs. But a unique kind 
of consciousness is proper to humans (following 
a very welcome and useful suggestion of Roy, 
2003, p.27, I use, and throughout this paper have 
used, the terms consciousness or conscious in 
this unique sense, and awareness or aware to re-
fer to intentionality). We humans not only have 
perceptions, as do other animals; we can also be 
refl ectingly aware of our perceptions; then we 
can name them, characterize them, and even talk 
about them as objects of interest per se, even as I 
am doing now. Besides, my talk is hardly a mere 
perceptual phenomenon. Talk carries meaning. 
Although you would not grasp my ideas apart 
from the words and signs I produce, the ideas 
you grasp are not those words and signs. The 
ideas we share are not at all perceptible per se; 
their actuality depends on acts of conscious un-
derstanding within human intelligence. The 
meaningful exchange we are engaging right now 
is a product of human consciousness at work. 
Our exchange is real, but it is not perceptible.
HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS MODELED 
ON ANIMAL PERCEPTION
Almost inevitably, the examples of qualia in 
consciousness studies are perceptual, for exam-
ple, the sensate experience of seeing red (Black-
more, 2012). Then, because animals exhibit 
sensation, they supposedly experience qualia. 
Then, because humans actually do experience 
qualia in percepts and because the human expe-
rience of qualia (but only the human experience) 
is correctly linked with consciousness, animals 
are said to have consciousness, too—as are, 
also, computers, thermostats, and anything that 
effectively interacts with its environment (e.g., 
Chalmers, 1996, pp.219-222, 225-229, 293-297; 
Dennett, 1991, pp.431-433; Griffi n, 1991, p.55; 
compare Penrose, 1994, p.56; Searle, 1980, 
1997, pp.11-14).
This line of reasoning ignores human distinc-
tiveness. It overlooks the fact that humans know 
qualia only because humans are conscious. The 
logical priority (“causality,” in another way of 
speaking) is this: Consciousness explains qua-
lia; qualia do not explain consciousness. 
The explanatory consciousness in question 
is not merely intentional. To be aware, to be 
consciously intentional, the consciousness in 
question must also, and with a logical priority, 
be conscious. Thus, James (1890/1950) spoke 
of that “obscurer feeling of something more” 
(p.305) as “the indispensable subjective condi-
tion of their [the objective contents of the mind] 
being experienced at all” (p.304). Intentional 
awareness must enjoy the self-consciousness 
that constitutes subjectivity, an abiding presence 
“to” oneself, not as an object of one’s concern, 
but as the concerned subject, as the one experi-
encing the object. 
Confusion arises easily because intentional-
ity—agent-object interaction—occurs in differ-
ent kinds: Intentionality pertains both to animal 
sensation and to human awareness. Both involve 
directedness of an agent toward some object. 
When consciousness is identifi ed with intention-
ality and when the stock examples are limited 
to perception, the intentionality of sensation is 
easily confl ated with the intentionality of aware-
ness. Two kinds of intentionality are confound-
ed. The perceptual response of animals is equat-
ed with the intellectual response of persons. Yet 
intentional awareness, refl ecting consciousness, 
refl ection on one’s experiences as such, must 
fi rst and foremost be conscious, non-refl ecting. 
Consciousness as conscious is the condition for 
the possibility of awareness as intentional. 
Whatever is refl ected on must fi rst be in con-
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sciousness as conscious for that content to then 
become an object of intentional awareness. 
Unless I am present “to” myself when present 
to an object, I could not, then, experience my 
awareness of the object. Only a unique kind of 
self-presence presents to us humans data with-
in consciousness to be refl ected upon as such, 
namely, as internal, mental experience: Humans 
can refl ect upon their experience as “experienc-
ers,” conceptualize the experience, and, then, 
even think about ideas. Only the potential self-
refl ectivity of awareness allows us humans to 
step back from conscious experiential input and, 
by stepping back and inquiring, to discern dif-
ferences—qualia—within the input. The experi-
ence of qualia depends on the experience of con-
sciousness. The misidentifi cation of conscious-
ness with the intentional experience of qualia 
allows for oversight of the genuine uniqueness 
of human consciousness as primordially non-
intentional, namely, conscious.
To make my overall point, consciousness 
studies controlled by a sensate-modeled epis-
temology will only be able to conceive of con-
sciousness as intentional awareness. The unex-
amined presuppositions within the epistemol-
ogy, so congenial to the materialistic Zeitgeist of 
contemporary scholarship (Spalding and Gagné, 
2013; Spalding, et al., 2014), prevent the under-
standing of consciousness as conscious.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
I have focused on aspects of David Chalmers’s 
(1996) theory of consciousness to exemplify 
pervasive shortcomings in current consciousness 
studies insofar as I know them. I discerned those 
shortcomings by applying the purely intellectual 
epistemology formulated by Bernard Lonergan 
(1957/1991, 1972, 1980/1990). The pivotal issue 
in this discernment was the difference between a 
sensate-modeled epistemology, which conceives 
knowing as a kind of perceiving, and an intel-
lectual epistemology, which conceives knowing 
as reasonable judgment, that is, the affi rmation 
of an idea on the basis of the relevant evidence. 
Arguably, reliance on a sensate-modeled episte-
mology and the functionalism compatible with it 
is the source of the many anomalies, peculiari-
ties, and whimsies within contemporary con-
sciousness studies: the inability to affi rm the 
reality of the invisible mind, the predilection 
for merely perceptual examples of objects of 
conscious experience, the focus on qualia that 
supposedly exemplifi es consciousness in non-
human animals, the limitation of consciousness 
to the subject-object interaction of intentional-
ity, the projection of palpable properties into the 
theoretically defi ned entities of contemporary 
physics, the imaginative construal of explana-
tory or formal causality as the tug and pull of 
effi cient causality in the work-a-day world, the 
argument based on unconscious zombies gra-
tuitously asserted to be indistinguishable from 
conscious human beings in their every external 
behavior, the attribution of consciousness even 
to inanimate interactive machines, and the pan-
psychism that salvages consciousness by fi nding 
it everywhere without its making a discernible 
difference (Chalmers, 1996, pp.177, 295-296; 
Dennett, 1991). Oversight of the genuine nature 
of human consciousness is at one with the con-
trolling sensate-modeled epistemology. Both re-
duce consciousness to perception and, perforce, 
report nothing more.
In contrast, allowance of Lonergan’s purely 
intellectual epistemology, grounded in atten-
tion to the full range of human mental acts (Hel-
miniak, 2014), entails acknowledgment of the 
non-material, non-perceptual nature of human 
consciousness. Concomitantly and illustratively, 
an intellectual epistemology also recognizes the 
meaningful nature of the human world. The real-
ities we know—including plains and mountains, 
organisms, emotions, memories, images, minds, 
insights, thoughts, and values—are only some-
times perceptible bodies. Not all that exists is 
material and palpable. On the selfsame criterion 
of reasonable judgment about an understanding 
of experienced data, the mental can be deemed 
as real as the physical; consciousness can be 
deemed as real as the brain; the spiritual can be 
deemed as real as the material; causality can be 
understood as a fully intellectual explanatory 
agency. Indeed, overall, meaning—not material-
ity or sensibility—is the distinctive characteris-
tic of human reality and the universe we share, 
though it also be material in part. Ours is a world 
“mediated by meaning and motivated by value” 
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(Lonergan, 1972, p.265). In this world, objectiv-
ity in knowing is not a spatially conceived mat-
ter of grappling with bodies lying “out there” 
in the material world or with images and feel-
ings encountered “in here” in the mental world. 
Neither is objectivity an oxymoronic matter of 
somehow eliminating from human knowledge 
all “subjective” input on the part of the knower. 
Rather, “objectivity is simply the consequence of 
authentic subjectivity, of genuine attention, gen-
uine intelligence, genuine reasonableness, genu-
ine responsibility” (p.265). Distinctively human 
intellectual knowing is a product of human con-
sciousness. An adequate theory of consciousness 
and an adequate epistemology go hand in hand. 
Affi rming the one entails affi rming the other. To 
be sure, this understanding challenges postmod-
ern sensitivities by implicating a sui generis, a 
non-material or spiritual, nature of conscious-
ness. At least, however, the results are coherent. 
Without requiring anyone to affi rm other-world-
ly or non-empirically-based entities—including 
zombies!—the results are also arguably true to 
the phenomenon in question, and the results wel-
comingly confi rm Chalmers’s “intuition” of the 
reality and uniqueness of human consciousness.
Endnotes
1: This article reports one major theme of Helminiak 
(2015) and, thus, includes long excerpts, sometimes 
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